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Article 1

Cohen: Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready?

CYBERTERRORISM: ARE WE LEGALLY READY?
Aviv Cohen*

INTRODUCTION
Human beings, by their very nature, have a tendency to find the
destructive side of most innovations and advancements. Current technological
developments present us with opportunities to enrich our lives by using simple,
quick and high-quality devices. At the same time, these technological
developments also hold the potential to be used as weapons in the hands of
terrorists. When I first became acquainted with the idea of cyberterrorism, I
was fascinated by the large amount of ink that had already been spilled on the
gloom prospects that cyberterrorism is not a question of "if' but of "when."
However, there was no reference as to how the international
community can react to such an attack after it had happened. This article is an
attempt to take that next step, and try to analyze whether the international tool
kit is well equipped to handle cyberterrorism. I have focused on the legal
aspects, rather than discussing the technological options to combat
cyberterrorism. While existing counter-terror conventions could, by way of
legal interpretation, apply to cyberterrorism, there could be a better direct way
of addressing this threat, via the creation of an explicit regime for the
suppression of cyberterrorism consisting of conventional prohibitions, Security
Council resolutions and international criminal laws.
The article includes four parts. Part I sets the stage for the arguments
presented above, and provides a brief introduction to the concept of terrorism
and the international response to these terrorist threats. Part II defines what
cyberterrorism is and what distinguishes it from other manifestations of
terrorism. Part III examines international conventions that were designed to
address certain types of terrorism and whether they would be applicable in cases
of cyberterrorism. Finally, Part IV discusses several avenues to address
cyberterrorism in the future.

* This Article is based on my LL.M. Thesis. I would like to thank Prof Moshe Hirsch and Prof
Yuval Shany of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for their insightful and
inspiring notes. This article is dedicated to my parents, Netta and Amir Cohen.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Almost every country in the world condemns terrorism and assigns
itself to fight it, but what exactly are they fighting against? Answering this
question and distinguishing terrorist acts from non-terrorist acts forced states to
crystallize definitions of terrorism. Defining the term "Terrorism," however, is
not a simple task. Specialists in the area of terrorism studies have devoted
hundreds of pages toward trying to develop a widely accepted definition of the
term, only to realize that "terrorism is intended to be a matter of perception and
is thus seen differently by different observers." 2
The complexity of finding an agreeable definition for "Terrorism" is
considered one of the obstacles in creating an international mechanism to
combat it. 3 Terrorism is a subjective concept, associated with different events in
the eyes of different groups of people. One thing remains clear - terrorism is
commonly regarded as a destructive force threatening the world as we know it
in a way that makes it nearly impossible to prevent.
The widely accepted definition for terrorism at the international level is
found in Article 2 Section 1(b) of the United Nation ("UN") International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999 ("The
Financing Convention").4
This definition has been reaffirmed in other
international instruments, such as in the UN Security Council Resolution 1566',
and is widely accepted among scholars. 6 The Article reads as follows:

1 Daniel Taub, Terrorism in the InternationalLaw, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW 476, 476 (Robbie
Sabel ed., 2003).
2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalizationand International
Terrorism, 27(3) INT'L
SEC. 30, 32 (2002).
3 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1048 (5th ed. 2003).
4 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39
I.L.M. 270 (hereinafter "Financing Convention").
S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004):
... Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which
constitute offenses within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances
justifiable by considerations ...
6 Tim Stephens, InternationalCriminallaw and the Response to InternationalTerrorism, 27(2) U.
NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 454, 461-462 (2004). See also: Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The
Evolution of Terrorism as Legal Concept in InternationalLaw and its Influence on Definitions in
Domestic Legislation,29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 23, 53 (2006).
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(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
This definition consists of several elements: first and foremost, the
causation of physical harm to a victim who is a civilian or other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict. From this
stems the conclusion that an act which does not involve physical harm could not
be considered an act of terrorism. 7 The physical harm is usually aimed at
targets which possess a symbolic value and/or potential to cause great damage.
For instance, suicide bombers on buses probably do not pick their targets
because of any symbolic value that is attributed to them, but pick them due to
their accessibility and the amount of potential damage they may achieve.
Events like 9/11 or the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos-Aires, on the
other hand, clearly carry a symbolic statement in addition to its potential to
cause massive destruction.'
The second element is the attacker's intention. Terrorism does not
happen by accident. Terrorists seek to influence three main groups - the
immediate victims of the terrorist act, the rest of the public in whom the terrorist
act has engendered a sense of fear and the policymakers on a national or
international level.
A part of terrorists' success derives from the fact that none of the
attackers' potential victims feels protected; nobody knows when terrorism will
strike next. This brings about the continuous state of terror (from the Latin
word "terrere " - to frighten), creating an aftermath of fear long after the event
itself took place. By hurting a group of random victims9, terrorists hope to
create widespread intimidation or fear, with which they wish to change human
policy or course of action.10 Generally speaking, the principal targets of a
terrorist episode are not the victims who are killed or maimed in the attack, but
rather the governments, publics, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope
to produce a reaction."
Despite its comprehensive quality, the Financing Convention does not
Daniel M. Schwartz, EnvironmentalTerrorism: Analyzing the Concept, 35(4) J. PEACE RES. 483,
485-486 (1998).
8 Id.

Gilbert Guilaume, Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 541(2004).
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 485-486.
" Cronin, supranote 2, at 32.
9

10
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address the identity of the terrorists. It defines only the activity and not the
actor. Thus, the definition may include individuals, groups and even state
entities. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this essay I will refer to "Terrorism"
as it is defined in the Financing Convention. It is worth noting that most
scholars have identified acts of terrorism as consisting of the same elements
enumerated in the Financing Convention - causing physical harm with the
intent to create a sense of fear and influence governmental processes.12
The UN approach toward combating Terrorism consisted of two main
courses of action - condemning the general phenomena and suppressing
specific manifestations of it.13 The current international regime against
terrorism consists of thirteen international conventions and protocols as well as
seven regional conventions. 14 The international conventions deposited with the
UN secretary cover issues like civil aviation, maritime, protection of diplomatic
agents, hostage situations, and more. Member states are currently negotiating a
fourteenth international treaty intended to be a comprehensive convention on

12 Walter Enders, Adolfo Sachsida & Todd Sandler, The Impact of Transnational
Terrorism on U.S.
Foreign DirectInvestment, 59(4) POL. RES. Q. 517, 518 (2006). See also Guilaume, supranote 9,

at 540.

Shaw, supra note 3, at 1049.
The international conventions are: Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, Sep. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
13
14

Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 246; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1652 U.N.T.S.
499; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304;
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 721; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
2149 U.N.T.S. 256; Financing Convention, supra note 4; International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/59/290.
The regional conventions are: Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998;
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism,
Jul. 1, 1999; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977; OAS
Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons
and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971; OAU Convention on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Jul. 14, 1999; SAARC Regional Convention on
Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987; Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, Jun. 4, 1999.
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international terrorism, as will be elaborated infra."
UN efforts to fight terrorism are also carried out through the Security
Council. Prior to 9/11, the Security Council efforts to combat international
terrorism took the form of sanctions against states considered to have links to
certain acts of terrorism, such as Libya and Sudan. In 1998, after the terrorist
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania the Security Council adopted Resolution
1189.16 This resolution included a short statement on condemning terrorism and
called upon states and international institutions to cooperate on the matter. It
did not, however, impose any sanctions. In resolution 1269 of October 1999,
the Security Council began advancing towards a more operative course of
action, and requested the Secretary-General of the UN "to pay special attention
to the need to prevent and fight the threat to international peace and security as a
result of terrorist activities."1 7
After 9/11 the Security Council began addressing the issue of
international terrorism more vigorously as was expressed in Security Council
Resolution 1373.1' Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution
1373 declares international terrorism "a threat to international peace and
security." It imposes binding obligations on all UN member states such as the
prevention and the suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, the
criminalization of terrorism-related activities and providing assistance to carry
out those acts, the denial of funding and safe haven to terrorists and the
exchange of information to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. The
resolution also establishes a "Counter Terrorism Committee" (CTC) to monitor
implementation of the resolution, with all states being required to report back to
the CTC regarding steps taken to execute Resolution 1373.19
In December 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change published a report calling for the creation of a comprehensive
global counter-terrorism strategy, encompassing the various counter-terrorism
activities under the leading role of the UN. Two years later, on September
2006, the General Assembly created the UN Global Counter Terrorism
Strategy.20 The Annex to this Resolution established a "Plan of Action",
specifying various measures to be taken by the Member States domestically and
General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by GeneralAssembly resolution
51/210 of 17 December 1996, Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/58/37, Supplement no. 37 (31 March 2 April 2003).
16 S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998).
17 S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 19, 1999),
5.
18 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
'9 Id, at T 6. See alsoEric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, and the Fightagainst Terrorism, 97(2) AM. J. INT'L L. 333-341 (2003).
20 G.A. Res. 60/288 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288
(Sep. 8, 2006).
15
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internationally. These measures were designed to enhance both international
cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism and the UN role within this
cooperation, as well as strengthening the individual state's commitment and
ability to eliminate terrorism in its territory and create "a culture of peace." The
effectiveness of this Strategy has yet to be determined.
II. CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEW THREAT
Over a decade ago, in 1998, Ehud Tenenbaum, an 18-year-old Israeli
hacker known as the "Analyzer," penetrated the computer systems of the
Pentagon, NASA, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center and other highly protected computer systems in the
U.S. A U.S. Defense Department official called it "the most organized and
systematic attack the Pentagon has seen to date." 21 Tenenbaum's hacking
operation was even given a code name, the "Solar Sunrise," by the F.B.I. In
2001, a 16-year-old from Canada, called "Mafia Boy" also managed to pass the
information security systems of some of the most sensitive computer
infrastructures in the U.S.
During the past ten years information security systems grew more
sophisticated, but so did hackers. This section asks the question - "What if?"
What if Ehud Tenebaum and "Mafia Boy" had been members of a terror
organization? What if they had been able to penetrate highly sensitive
information in the Pentagon? What if they had covered their tracks better?
Terrorist groups have been using the Internet for various purposes,
such as communicating, propagandizing, recruiting and collecting intelligence. 22
The network of computer-mediated communication is ideal for terrorists as
communicators: it is decentralized, it is more difficult to subject it to control or
restriction and it allows access to anyone who wishes to use it. 23 However, the
cyber-world can also be used in a different way, not only as an indirect tool for
executing an attack, but also as a direct weapon.
One way to use the weapon of cyberspace is through cyberattacks on
websites. For instance, such attacks have taken place in the India-Pakistan
dispute over Kashmir, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and

Master

hacker

Analyzer'

held

in
Israel, Mar.
18,
1998,
available at
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9803/18/analyzer/index.htmnl.
22 Gabriel Weimann, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA, THE
NEW CHALLENGES (2006).
See also: Benjamin R. Davis, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist Exploitation of the
Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved Tools for Cyber Governance, 15 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 119-186 (2006).
23 Id. at 25.
21
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against NATO websites during the crises in Kosovo in the early 1990's.24
These attacks still do not constitute "terrorism" in the sense that they do not
cause physical harm and do not intend to influence the government, as required
by the definition of terrorism in the Financing Convention.
The other way of using cyberspace as a weapon is the case of
cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is the use of computer networks in order to harm
human life or to sabotage critical national infrastructure in a way that may cause
harm to human life. 25 Joel Trachtman distinguishes between different types of
networks that may be subjected to cyberterrorist attacks: military and civilian
defense networks; other governmental networks (police, fire); privately or
publicly owned networks used to control public utilities and other systems for
providing infrastructural services (electricity, water); and public networks used
by individual consumers and businesses for communication, education etc ... 26
Cyberterrorism may be disrupting bank data, penetrating rail company
computers, blocking computer communication at an international airport,
deleting the voter register 24 hours before an election, and many more. All these
systems are service providers, which means they are linked to the Internet in
one way or another and therefore are under the risk of invasion. Today,
Western societies are dependent in almost every aspect of life upon computer
communication. Computer systems control nearly everything required for our
daily routines and our emergency plans.
But is cyberterrorism similar in its characteristics to other forms of
terrorism mentioned earlier? Surely there must be some difference between
hijacking an airplane with a gun and hijacking it by taking control over the
airplane's computer system. Establishing the legal nature of cyberterrorism is
crucial in combating it through international legal instruments, which, as was
demonstrated above, are central to the international community's fight against
terrorism.
As stated above, terrorism exhibits the elements of physical harm and

Janet J. Prichard & Laurie E. MacDonald, Cyber Terrorism: A Study of the Extent of Coverage in
Computer Security Textbooks, 3 J. INFO. TECH. EDU. 279, 281 (2004).
25 This is according to Shlomo Harnoy, Founder, senior VP & Professional
manager at SDEMA
Group, and Yossi Or, VP Information Security at SDEMA Group. The SDEMA Group is an
integrated, homeland security solutions partnership specializing in risk mitigation. SDEMA also
offers information security service including market forward protection against cyber terrorism. This
definition is also accepted in academic literature, see Weimann, supra note 22, at 148; Dorothy E.
Denning, "Cyberterrorism": Testimony before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 23, 2000,
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html.
26 Joel P. Trachtman, Global Cyberterrorism,Jurisdiction,and InternationalOrganization,Jul. 20,
2004, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=566361.
24
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intention to cause a sense of fear and to influence the decision making process.
The cause of physical harm can be attained through disruption of computer
systems, such as disabling traffic light systems, hospital computers, electric
companies' computer etc . . .

These acts bring about a sense of fear and

uncertainty among the victim population, which in turn leads to pressuring the
government to "do something" about it. Thus, you do not need to go through
the trouble of getting a gun or a knife onboard an aircraft in order to become a
terrorist. You can get the same results sitting in front of a computer screen.
In addition, most of the potential infrastructure targets of
cyberterrorism, like those stated above, are protected by some sort of
information security and anti-virus programs. Penetrating these programs takes
time and knowledge, and it happens solely if the hacker intends for it to happen.
Of course not every Ehud Tenenbaum is a terrorist just because he intended to
break into classified computer networks. As the abovementioned definition
requires, the intention element also means there was intention to influence a
government course of action.
Regardless, cyberterrorism has several unique characteristics
distinguishing it from other forms of Terrorism.27 We defined Terrorism as
being aimed at a certain target that has great potential damage in terms of
human life. The identity of the humans itself did not matter. Cyberterrorism,
on the other hand, can hurt a very specific group of people - the population of
modem western countries.
As stated above, cyberterrorism hurts computerized infrastructure, on
which advanced societies have come to depend. Thus, different societies are
vulnerable to cyberterrorism in different degrees in accordance with their level
of dependence on technology and computer networks. The more dependent a
state is on electronic communications and information processing networks, the
more vulnerable to cyberterrorism it will be. 28 As Richard Clarke put it already
in 1999 - "Ifyou are connected you are vulnerable." 29
One might say that the level of technology advancement also results in
better defense systems, which enable states to protect themselves from these
kinds of attacks. This is correct, yet while assessing the volume of the risk, it
remains clear that the U.S. is more exposed to cyberterrorism than Rwanda.
This, in turn, will force the cyberterrorists trying to attack the U.S. to become
more sophisticated themselves. Still, these cat and mouse games between the

27 Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In defense of Cyberterrorism:
An Argument for
Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 12 (2002).
28 Weimann, supra note 22, at 148; Trachtman, supra
note 26, at 5.
29 Richard Clarke, Threats to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives
Towards

Preventing Cyber TerroristAttacks, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 33, 37 (1999-2000).
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cyberterrorists and the information security experts are most likely to occur in
the U.S. and not in Rwanda because the U.S. has more at stake - it is more
dependent on its information security to hold on against a cyberterrorism attack
because it is more dependent on computerized infrastructure.
Another distinctive feature of cyberterrorism is its relatively low costs.
A terrorist attack in the physical world requires recruiting an executor,
equipping him with weapons or explosives and making sure he will pass all
security checks on his way to the designated location. Cyberterrorism on the
other hand, will most likely save the terrorist these costs and obstacles.
Committing a cyber-attack, assuming you know how, does not involve
purchasing weapons or actually being present at the attack's location. All a
cyberterrorist needs is a good computer and hacking skills that exceed his
opponent's. In today's world, anyone has the potential to acquire the required
technical skills, as a crash-course "Hacking 101" can be easily be found on the
Internet itself.
Despite all the gloomy predictions of a cyberterrorism doomsday, no
single instance of real cyberterrorism has yet been recorded. This fact leads
people to think that the prophecies on cyberterrorism are exaggerated.30
However, there are several arguments that need to be considered. Theoretically
speaking, just because an event has not yet happened, does not affect the
possibility of it happening in the future. Similarly, the superpowers in the
international system have been preparing for the scenario of a nuclear war even
though it is also based on an event that, fortunately, has not occurred. In
addition, like physical terror cells that hold "sleeping agents" at their enemy's
territory ready to be active on a phone call, so too can computer viruses be
programmed to be active as of a certain date in the future, until which time no
one will know of their existence.
Shlomo Hamoy and Yossi Or, both experts in the field of counterterrorism, have pointed out that a possible reason as to why there have been no
cyber-attacks could simply be that terrorist organizations have not yet acquired
the technological ability, which is the core factor in cyberterrorism.3 1 Other
reasons are difficult to discern. At least in theory this is a highly effective
weapon for terrorists. Assuming that the reason there has, of yet, been no
cyberterrorism event is indeed the technological gap between the potential
targets and potential terrorist, this calls for immediate action. Technological
gaps can be closed, rapidly. Since the most critical infrastructures in Western
societies are networked through computers, the potential threat of

30
31

Weimann, supranote 22, at 149.
See also Brenner & Goodman, supranote 27, at 44-52.
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cyberterrorism is, at least in theory, alarming. 3 2
Governments in Western countries have been taking cyberterrorism
threats very seriously for at least a decade. For instance, the U.S. authorities
conducted the first experiment of its kind, designed to check the level of
readiness of U.S. computer systems for the next attack. This operation was held
in 2002 and was given the symbolic name "Digital Pearl Harbor." The results
were startling. The "Red Team," which was supposed to try to hack into
computer systems and disrupt their functioning, succeeded in nearly all cases.3
After this experiment the U.S. government began a campaign of improving
readiness for cyberterrorism, both on the technical and legislative level. 4
In Israel, Government Decision B-84 from 2002 defined critical data
systems that will undergo a security upgrade to adjust their information security
systems to a scenario of cyberterrorism. In Europe, governments have acted not
only on a singular basis, such as the establishing of the National Technical
Assistance Center in the United Kingdom,35 but also in the framework of the
European Union. In 2005 the European Council adopted the European Program
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) as part of its overall fight against
terrorism. The EPCIP focuses mainly on strengthening the computer security
systems, in order to enhance the preparedness for terrorist attacks involving
critical infrastructure.
Currently there is no international legal instrument which deals
specifically with cyberterrorism. Since the threat seems not to be far fetched, it
is prudent thinking to try and see what the legal international community has in
store for the "Day After." Accordingly, the following chapters will examine the
question of whether the existing international regime on terror, as previously
described, is adequate for an event of cyberterrorism. If it is - the international
community has sufficient legal instruments in case the next Ehud Tenenbuam is
a terrorist. If it is not - some alternatives must be considered.

Weimann, supranote 22, at 148; see Brenner & Goodman, supranote 27.
33 Eric Purchase & Franch Caldwell, Digital PearlHarbor:a Case Study in Industry Vulnerability
to cyber Attacks, in: Sumit Ghosh, Manu Malek & Edward A. Stohr (eds.), GUARDING YOUR
32

BusiNEss -A MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO SECUIRTY (2004).

34 Tara Mythri Raghavan, In fear of Cyberterrorism:An Analysis of the Congressionalresponse,
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 297-312 (2003).
35 Clive Walker, Cyberterrorism:Legal Principle and Law in the United Kingdom, 110(3) PENN
ST. L. REV. 625-665 (2006).
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III. INTERNATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM CONVENTIONS AND
THEIR APPLICABILITY TO CYBERTERRORISM: TWO CASESTUDIES
The previous section presented cyberterrorism as the next phase in the
evolution of terrorism and as one of the significant threats to future international
peace and security. While information security experts are assigned with the
task of maintaining the technological gap in favor of the governments over the
cyberterrorists, it is in the hands of international law experts to make sure that
the international community is prepared for the "day after" the first
cyberterrorism attack.
The legal analysis of the international response to cyberterrorism
begins with an examination of the existing legal framework. In order to
determine the applicability of any of those conventions to cyberterrorism, the
first step is to make sure that the offenses defined in them are not limited to
execution by physical means. As explained earlier, the current conventions were
originally designed to respond to specific manifestations of terrorism, and hence
they create specific offenses to suit each scenario, such as aircraft hijackings or
hostage situations. Since most of these conventions were drafted when
cyberterrorism was considered to be, at most, science fiction, it is not at all
certain that they apply to a cyber attack.3 6
The next sections provide the legal background to treaty interpretation
and examine three of the thirteen counter-terror conventions to see whether they
apply to cyberterrorism or not. The selection of those three particular treaties is
by no means exhaustive regarding the question of applicability, and further
examination of all counter terror conventions is needed. However, due to the
limits of the current research I have chosen to focus on leading conventions
from different fields of terror, namely: terrorism aimed at aircrafts and terrorist
bombings.
A. Interpretation of International Conventions
International law, much like domestic legal systems, suffers from an
inherent deficiency - it creates legal regimes to correspond with a given reality
but which might not be suitable to address changes in that reality. The
instrument developed to cope with this problem is the notion that treaties, like

This can be said with respect to any new method of terrorism that may evolve, for further reading
on the criticism of the counter-terrorism conventions and their failure to address new methods of
terrorism, see Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8
NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 215, 221-222 (2002).
36
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domestic constitutions, are "living documents." This allows deviating from the
strict literal meaning of the text as long as it fulfills the rationale of the text.
Hence, a text that was written five years ago or one-hundred-years ago can
maintain its relevance. In contrast, there is a point of view which holds that a
legal document should be read in the context in which it was written. As will be
seen, the controversy between these two theories of interpretation is reflected in
the attempt to adjust existing conventions to a threat that did not concretize at
the time of drafting.
The issue of interpretation of international law was codified in 1969 in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties3 7 (The Vienna Convention), also
know as the "Treaty on Treaties." 38 Articles 31-33 set forth the interpretive
norms and rules for all treaties concluded between states. 39 The Vienna
Convention, including Articles 31-32, is widely considered to reflect customary
international law by scholars 40 as well as by the International Court of Justice. 41
Most scholars agree that Article 31 puts a strong emphasis on a textual
approach to treaty interpretation.42 The preference of the textual approach,
however, is not absolute. The recourse to contextual interpretation exists at the
end of Article 31(1). In addition, Article 31 allows relying upon sources other
than the text of the treaty, but only to the extent that the parties agreed to

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Richard D. Kearney & Robert e. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495-562
(1970).
39 A separate convention governs the interpretation of agreements between states and international
organizations and agreements between international organizations, see: Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543. Since Article 33 deals with preference of translation
issues, it does not concern the following treaty analysis and it will not be discussed.
40 Shaw, supra note 3, at 839; Anthony Clark Arend, Who's Afraid of the Geneva Convention?
Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 709, 722
(2007); Jared Wessel, Relational Contract Theory and Treaty Interpretation:End-Game Treaties v.
Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 149, 162 (2004); Evan Criddle, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation,44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 438 (2004);
P. Brazil, Some Reflections on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 6 FED. L. REv. 223,
235 (1974-1975).
41 See e.g. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 199 I.C.J. 16; Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S. W. Afr.), 1971 I.C.J. 16; Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46; Nuc lear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 253. See also adherence to the Vienna Convention by the Dispute Settlement Body of the
World Trade Organization: Panel Report, Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports
ofEntry, WT/DS366 (Apr. 27, 2009) 7.81.
42 Arend, supra note 40, at 723; Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146(3) U.
PA. L. REV. 687, 744 (1998); Wessel, supranote 40, at 163; Criddle, supranote 40, at 438; Brazil,
supranote 40, at 236.
37
38
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consider those sources as providing authoritative interpretive information.43
Due to rapid technological changes, the text of an agreement might become
obsolete. This creates a need to expand the treaty, either implicitly or explicitly,
so as to cover new circumstances. 44 It should be noted that another possible
way of addressing changes in circumstances is to conclude a new treaty. While
the latter option is examined further ahead in Part III, the following examination
centers on the use of interpretation as a means of adjusting legal texts to
changes in the legal reality.
Article 32 allows the interpreter to use the negotiating history (travaux
prdparatories)in order to confirm the analysis reached under Article 31, and
seems to give only secondary place to the exploration of the preparatory work.45
On the other hand, Article 32 does not specify the extent of ambiguity or
obscurity that must persist after completing the Article 31 analysis in order to
trigger Article 32(a), thus, it could be argued that even reasonable doubt may
46
justify recourse to Article 32.
B. Case-Study #1: The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971
A State Airline company is a national symbol. Though nowadays the
number of privately owned airline companies is larger than in the past, these
airline companies, as well as the state owned ones, are still subject to
governmental oversight and regulation on the national as well as the
international level. Their existence, routes, and most of their commercial
activities are a product of governmental cooperation.47 Commercial aviation
disasters, intentional or accidental, are uniquely treated by the public and news
media as singular eventS48 An airplane contains the two features terrorists seek:
it has a symbolic nature and an enormous damage potential. Furthermore,
aviation disasters affect world order and economic relations between states,49 as

Arend, supranote 40, at 724.
Wessel, supranote 40, at 177.
45 Arend, supra note 40, at 725. See Eberhard P. Deutsch, Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 297, 299 (1971).
46 Criddle, supra note 40, at 440.
47 Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hiacking and International Terrorism - An Historical
andLegalReview, 15 INT'L BUS. LAW 53, 57 (1987).
48 Amon Haruta & Kirk Hallahan, Airline Crisis Communication:A Japan-U.S.
Comparative Study,
13(1) ASAIN J. COMM. 122-150 (2004). See also William A. Crenshaw, Civil Aviation: Targetfor
Terrorism, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 60-69 (1988).
49 Dawson, supranote 47, at 57.
43
44
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aviation is a key factor in international trade.o
For these reasons and others, commercial aircrafts have been
prominent targets of terrorist attacks." Aviation terrorism manifests itself by
means such as hijacking an aircraft, firing heat-seeking missiles at an aircraft,
bombing an aircraft or airport lounges, gunning down passengers at airports,
and more recently, turning aircrafts into guided missiles aimed at financial and
governmental institutions. 5 2
International law has dealt with aviation safety since the early years of
the twentieth century. As soon as an airline route was established between Paris
and London it was obvious that basic standards and principles in this new field
were needed. In 1919, the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 53
was signed in Paris, creating for the first time an international aviation
organization, known as CINA. In 1944, after World War II presented new
frontiers to military as well as civil aviation, fifty-two world nations met in
Chicago, U.S., and drafted a new convention, the Convention on International
Civil Aviation. 4 This Convention established the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency that became a part of the United
Nations, and replaced CINA.
Though the Paris and Chicago conventions dealt extensively with flight
safety regulation, they did not deal with aviation security. The first effort was
made in 1963, at the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, signed in Tokyo,5 6 to assert formal international
control over criminal acts such as hijackings. 7 Following the aut dedere aut
judicare principle, the Tokyo Convention was designed to insure that when an
offense" was committed on board an aircraft in flight, at least one state would
Michael Milde, The InternationalCivil Aviation Organization:After 30 Years and Byond, 1996
AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 61 (1996).
51 Paul S. Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism, 41 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 651 (2003). See also Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Aviation Terrorism and the
InternationalCivil Aviation Organization,25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 219, 221 (1987).
52 Dempsey, supra note 51, at 651.
53 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173.
54 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. (hereinafter:
"Chicago Convention").
5 For further reading on the ICAO see: Milde, supra note 50; Eugene Sochor, ICAO and Armed
Attacks against CivilAviation, 44 INT'L J. 134-170 (1988-1989); Fitzgerald, supranote 51.
56 See Conventions, supra note 14.
5 The first hijack attempt on a commercial aircraft occurred in 1931, but the first real wave of
hijackings began around 1958 when individuals hijacked aircraft as a means to divert them from
Cuba to the United States. See Dempsey, supranote 51, at 664; Dawson, supranote 47, at 59.
58 Article 1(1)-(2) of the Tokyo Convention defines the offenses as follows:
"Article 1: (1) This Convention shall apply in respect of:
50
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be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the offense and bring the offenders to
justice.
Although the Tokyo Convention included a universal jurisdiction as a
principle remedy, it in fact did not prove to be sufficient in confronting the
increased number of acts of terrorism against aircrafts in the late 1960's. It was
clear that there was a need for a broader definition of unlawful acts against
aircrafts and a more definite statement as to the appropriate penalties than those
offered by the Tokyo Convention.
The ICAO responded by adopting the Hague Convention of 1970.59
The Hague Convention dealt specifically with acts of unlawful seizure of
aircrafts, 60 and was considered a more efficient instrument than the Tokyo
Convention. However, aviation terrorists began using methods that were not
addressed by the Hague Convention, i.e. performing acts that did not constitute
"seizing or exercising control over an aircraft." As quickly as 1971, only one
year after the signing of the Hague Convention, there was already a need for
further measures and for the creation of further criminal offenses. 6 1 Thus, in
1971, the ICAO drafted the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (The Montreal Convention).
The Montreal Convention broadened the legal instruments available to
combat aviation terrorism. It expanded the definition of "offense" beyond mere
seizure as to include the general category of "interference with aircraft."62
Though it was criticized for not addressing situations of state involvement in a

(a) offences against penal law;
(b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize
the safety of aircraft or of persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board;
(2) Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect
of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft
registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the
surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State."
59 See Conventions, supra note 14. See also: Dawson, supra note 47, at 60.
60 Article 1 of the Hague Convention defines the offences as follows:
"Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of
intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to
perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform
any such act
Commits and offence (hereinafter referred to as "the offence").
61 Dawson, supranote 47, at 60.
62 Dempsey, supra note 51, at 659. See also D.J. Musch, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM
AGREEMENTS AND COMMENTARY 41 (2004).
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terrorist act, as was the case in the famous Lockerbie incident,63 the Montreal
Convention is still regarded as a primary instrument in dealing with aerial
terrorism.
The Applicability of the Montreal Convention to a Cyberterrorism Attack
Article 1 of the Montreal Convention defines the offenses under the
scope of the Convention. In the deliberation on the draft convention, some
countries preferred the enumerative approach, 64 listing a limited number of
specific offenses, while others supported a general definition.65 The latter states
argued that adopting a list of offenses would necessarily mean that future acts,
unpredictable at the time of drafting, would be left out the scope of the
Convention.66 After much debate the enumerative approach was adopted,
though the definition was drafted quite broadly, raising doubts regarding the
actual difference between the two approaches.
Article 1(1) states five
alternative offenses being executed by the prime offender, and Article 1(2)
criminalizes offenses of attempt and accomplice. Article 1(1) reads as follows:
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) Performs an act of violence against a person on board
an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the
safety of that aircraft; or
(b) Destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to

On December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York was bombed over the town of
Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 passengers, crew and local townsman. The U.S. and The U.K.
accused Libya of being responsible for the attack, and brought the matter before the International
Court of Justice. The ICJ was unable to establish that Libya had violated the Montreal Convention,
since it did not address the issue of state-sponsored terrorism. See Case concerning questions of
interpretation and application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.) 1998 I.C.J. 9. For further reading see Jonathan A. Frank, A return to
Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention in the Wake of the September 11" Terrorist Attacks:
Ramifications of Past Security Council and InternationalCourt of Justice Action, 30(4) DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 532, 536 (2002).
64 ICAO, InternationalConference on Air Law: Minutes and Documents, ICAO Doc. 9801, p. 21,
Delegates of France and Japan (hereinafter: "ICAO Documents").
65 Id., p.21, 27, Delegates of Canada and the People's Republic of
the Congo.
66 Abraham Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventionsfor the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure and
Interference with Aircraft, PartII. the Montreal Convention, 14(2) CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268,
280 (1975).
63
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such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) Places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service,
by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it
which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to
it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) Destroys or damages air navigation facilities or
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to
endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(e) Communicates information which he knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in
flight.
Considering the threat of cyberterrorism, which did not exist during the
drafting of the Montreal Convention, it is time to re-evaluate whether the
offenses listed in Article 1 are applicable to a cyberterrorism event, or whether
the predictions of the states who voted for the general definition turned out to be
accurate. Unlike other conventions, the Montreal Convention does not include a
definitions clause that would assist in interpreting its provisions. Thus, the legal
analysis of the text is based on the rules of interpretation set in the Vienna
Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 67 and other interpretation guidelines,
mainly including the protocols of the Montreal Conference in which the draft
convention was approved 68 and additional related literature.
The starting point of the discussion is that all five items listed in
Article 1 reflect the notion that the Convention meant to protect the safety of an
aircraft in flight, rather than protection of human life. 69 Therefore, intentionally
endangering the life of a passenger without endangering the safety of the
aircraft is not an offense covered by the Convention. It can, on the other hand,
be argued that the two elements can not in fact be separated, and that one could
not endanger the safety of the aircraft without endangering the lives of the crew
and passengers in that aircraft and that the lives of the crew and passengers
could not be put at risk without jeopardizing the safety of the aircraft.70
It should also be noted that according to the text of Article 1, there is
no requirement that the perpetrators or their accomplices be on board the
67
68
69
70

Vienna Convention, supranote 37, § 31, 32.
ICAO Documents, supranote 64.
Abramovsky, supranote 66, at 281.
ICAO Documents, Delegate of the United Kingdom, supranote 64, at 27.
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aircraft. This is another feature of the Montreal Convention which makes it
more advanced than the Hague Convention. Unlike the Hague Convention, the
provisions of the Montreal Convention may apply whether the alleged offender
was on board the aircraft or on the ground. This enhances the likelihood that
the Montreal Convention would be suitable for dealing with cyberterrorism
against an aircraft, since as noted in the previous chapter, one of the advantages
of cyberterrorism is the ability to execute an attack from a distant location.
The Montreal Convention also deals with offenses committed on board
an aircraft "in service," as opposed to an aircraft "in flight."71 This extends the
period of time to which the provisions of the Convention are applicable. At the
deliberation on the adoption of the draft convention, most participating states
hesitated to adopt the "in service" period. Those states believed that as long as
an offender on board an aircraft is subject to both arrest and prosecution in the
state where the aircraft is confined, there is no need for international
intervention.72 This point illustrates that the focus of the Convention seems to
be on ex post punishment rather than ex ante prevention.
Based on these starting points, the following analysis examines
whether the different items listed in Article 1(1) are applicable to
cyberterrorism. It is important to note that the primary aspect of my analysis is
a legal, rather than a technical one. Thus, I assume that all the activities that
will be mentioned below are technologically possible. My main purpose is to
examine the language of the text and its possible interpretations.
(a) Act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight that is
likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft
Article 1(1)(a) is designed to prevent and punish acts of violence
committed against persons on board an aircraft in flight. The term "Act of

71

72

Article 2 of the Montreal Convention defines the two categories as follows:
(a) An aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment
when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment
when any such door is opened for disembarkation; in the case of forced
landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities
take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on
board;
(b) An aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the
preflight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a
specific flight until twenty four hours after any landing; the period of service
shall, in any event, extend for the entire period during which the aircraft is in
flight as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article.
Abramovsky, supranote 66, at 278.
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Violence" is in fact wider than the phrase of the original draft convention.73
The original draft provided that Article 1(1)(a) would apply in case an offender
commits "an armed attack against the life of a person on board." Adopting the
"Act of Violence" term does not restrict the provision's applicability to the use
of certain weapons, nor does it restrict the offense to acts which jeopardize the
life of the victim. 74
With respect to the term "Person," it is clear that an attack on the pilot
or the navigator of an aircraft in flight would endanger the safety of the aircraft.
The less obvious cases regard the attack upon a flight attendant or a passenger.
As mentioned above, the criteria for applying this provision in a specific case is
not the gravity of the violent act, but rather its likelihood to affect the safety of
the aircraft in flight. Hence, a murder of a passenger or a crew member other
then the pilot or the navigator may not constitute the offense.
On the other
hand, since the Article requires only "likelihood" to endanger the safety of the
aircraft, it may be argued that an attack on a passenger could create panic and
hysteria that are possible to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight.
Similarly, attacking a flight attendant could endanger the safety of an aircraft in
flight since the flight attendants possess vital skills in cases of emergency.
Can an "act of violence" against a "person" on board an aircraft in
flight be carried out through Cyberterrorism? The answer to this question
depends on the meaning given to the term "violence." While there is extensive
literature on the meaning of the term "violence" in general philosophical
writings, I chose to adhere to the legal interpretations given to it. Violence is
usually associated with a physical element, but the physical element can be
established in two ways. In the first, as described in Black's Law Dictionary,
the physical element regards the attacker. Violence, according to this view, is
referred to as an unjustified use of force. 76 If we were to adopt this
interpretation, than Cyberterrorism would probably be excluded from the scope
of Article 1(1)(a), given that the cyberterrorist is not using any physical force.
According to the second possible interpretation, it can be argued that
the physical element is attributed not to the perpetrator, but to the victim. Thus,
violence is established whenever physical harm was caused to the victim of a
certain act.7
This view is reflected in the deliberation held at the ICAO
Conference. Since cyberterrorism may result in physical damage to persons, for

73

Id, at 284.

74 Id. See C. S. Thomas & M. J. Kirby, The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

against the Safety of CivilAviation, 22(1) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 163, 165 (1973).
7 Abramovsky, supranote 66, at 285.
76 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990).
7 ICAO Documents, supranote 64, at 139.
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instance by a plane crash or damage to the aircraft's pressure system,
cyberterrorism can very well constitute the offense described in Article 1(1)(a).
Thus, it is possible that item (a) will apply to a cyberterrorism attack on an
aircraft.
(b) Destroying an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft
which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety
in flight
Article 1(1)(b) penalizes acts of sabotage against the aircraft itself.
The destruction or damage must occur while the aircraft is "in service," but the
particular act which causes the destruction of the aircraft may be performed
before the aircraft is "in service."7 This further expands the period to which
the Convention can be applied. In addition, since the provision does not require
causing harm to a person, the offense may be constituted whether or not the
aircraft is occupied. 79 This is not to be taken lightly, as it establishes the
applicability of other provisions of the Convention to a case of mere property
damage.
Item (b) contains two key elements. First, the action taken by the
offender should be "destroying" or "causing damage" to an aircraft in service.
Second, that action must result in disabling the aircraft from flying or enabling
it to fly but endangering its safety in flight. Much like the term "violence" in
item (a), it is likely that the "destruction" and "damage" referred to in item (b)
were also intended to include physical destruction or damage. There have been
cases in which simple maintenance errors, such as losing screws or cutting
wires, have resulted in devastating crashes. These acts can be performed by a
terrorist who has access to the aircraft. In order for cyberterrorists to cause such
damage, they must take control over computerized systems in the aircraft and
through them achieve the same damage as the cutting of a wire. Since this item
focuses on the result of the act, rather than on the means achieving those results,
the text of Article 1(1)(b) could encompass damage to an aircraft caused by
cyberterrorism.

78
7

Thomas & Kirby, supra note 74, at 165.
Abramovsky, supranote 66, at. 286.
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(c) Places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or
to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause
damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight
Article 1(1)(c) was originally intended to deal with situations in which
explosives or other incendiary devices are placed on board an aircraft.so The
phrase "Any Means Whatsoever" was originally put in the Article with the
purpose to encompass acts such as the use of mails or the airline food storage to
place incendiary devices on board an aircraft." A proposal by the delegate of
Egypt to replace the former term with the general term "anything" was rejected,
and the protocols of the Montreal Conference reveal that "any means
whatsoever" was perceived as covering all possibilities.8 2 With respect to this
notion, "any means whatsoever" can be interpreted as cyberterrorism.
Can a cyberterrorist place a device or substance on board an aircraft in
service that would destroy it or endanger its safety in flight? The answer is
probably yes. The computers on board an aircraft are in charge of almost every
function in the aircraft, including the most critical ones like igniting the engines,
controlling the landing gear. Hence, it is possible that a cyberterrorist would
plant software that would disrupt the aircraft's computer system in one of the
ways enumerated in the provision. Thus, it appears that the language of item (c)
is applicable to cyberterrorism.
(d) Destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight
Article 1(1)(d) includes situations of intentionally committing an act of
interference with the operation of aeronautical communications. 83
In
compliance with Article 28 of the Chicago Convention, "Navigation Facilities"
means airport control towers, and radio and meteorological services used in
international flights.84
Like in item (b), it appears that "destroying" or "damaging" air
navigation facilities could be executed through cyberterrorism. Moreover,
"interfering with their operation" may also be carried out through
cyberterrorism. According to Michael Oron, aircraft engineer and former El-Al

Abramovsky, supranote 66, at 286; Thomas & Kirby, supranote 74, at 166.
s1 ICAO Documents, supranote 64, at 38.
82 Id, at 108.
83 Thomas & Kirby, supra note 74,
at 166.
84 Chicago Convention, supra
note 54.
80
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representative at Boeing, the navigation system on board an aircraft was
designed to be a closed circuit and independent system. This means that the
sensors on the body of the aircraft which measure temperature and altitude
could almost never be exposed to foreign disruption.
While this may be a relief to the worry of cyberterrorists attacking
those sensors, there are other navigation facilities that are conditional upon
communication between ground control computers and the computers on board
the aircraft. It is also important to note that item (d) sets the threshold at only
likelihood to endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight. Taking this into
consideration, it is possible to think of a computer interference with the line of
communication between the ground and the aircraft. This could be carried out
in a way that would interfere with the operation of the navigation facilities thus
endangering the safety of the flight or through interference with the ground
facilities directing the aircraft to landing or take off. This scenario is closely
related to the following item (e).
(e) Communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight
Article 1(1)(e) covers situations in which a person who himself is not
on board an aircraft exercises control over the craft. According to the observer
of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations at the Montreal
Conference, such acts may be used to divert the aircraft to an aerodrome located
in an area in which no maps were on board.86 The safety of an aircraft in flight
could be seriously endangered by such acts. This item also covers bomb hoax
situations. In this sense, the requirement of knowledge eliminates cases where
the false information was given in good faith.8
Using the phrase "communicate" makes the offense in item (e)
applicable to cyberterrorism. When originally drafted, the scenario associated
with item (e) was that of a vocal transmission between the ground and the
aircraft, but in today's high-technological world, the transmission could be
between the computers on the ground directly to the computers on board the
aircraft. According to Amir Cohen, an expert on communication systems, the
communication systems of aircrafts are shifting from voice-based-

" Interview with Michael Oron, aircraft engineer and former El-Al representative at Boeing.
Chicago Convention, supranote 64, at 42.
87 Abramovsky, supranote 66,
at 286.
88 Amir Cohen is the C.E.O. of SigNext Wireless Ltd., a leading company
in the design and
development of innovative wireless communication system based on space diversity multiple access
technology.
86
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communication to data-communication. This shift greatly contributes to flight
safety and enables ground control to monitor the aircraft activities more
accurately in real-time. Nevertheless, this wireless communication between the
aircraft computer systems and the ground control creates vulnerabilities and
exposes it to cyberterrorism, just like any other computer communication
system.
In 1988 a Supplementary Protocol to the Montreal Convention (the
Protocol) was adopted.8 9 The Protocol expands the scope of the Montreal
Convention by constituting two additional offenses:
1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and
intentionally, using any device, substance or weapon:
(a) Performs an act of violence against a person at an
airport serving international civil aviation which causes
or is likely to cause serious injury or death; or
(b) Destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an
airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not
in service located thereon or disrupts the services of the
airport,
If such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that
airport.
With respect to item (a), it seems that it is possible that it will apply to
cyberterrorism. 90
In addition, item (b) could probably also apply to
cyberterrorism. The terms "destroy" and "damage" were discussed at length
previously, and so I will concentrate on the phrase "disrupting the services of
the airport." It is conceivable that this term could also be executed through
cyberterrorism. Any computer activity that interferes with the standard
operation of the computer systems in the airport could comply with this
requirement of the offense.
In conclusion, the Montreal Convention and the Supplementary
Protocol constitute provisions relating to seven international offenses regarding
the field of aviation security. If in the future cyberterrorists would attack
aircrafts or airports, any of those seven offenses could be applicable.

89 See Conventions, supra note 14.
90 For the discussion on the interpretation of the term "Act of Violence" and its relation to

Cyberterrorism see id.
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Nevertheless, their application is dependent upon the interpretation of terms
such as "violence" and "destroys," in a way that can be countered by good
arguments claiming for the literal meaning of the text. Furthermore, while these
offenses seem to cover a wide range of possible cyberterrorist attacks, the lack
of a clear and general prohibition on using computerized infrastructures for
executing terrorist acts leaves a gap for cyberterrorism attacks that could not be
covered by the abovementioned offenses.
C. Case-Study #2: The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, 1997
On June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb exploded outside the northern
perimeter of a military compound housing American and Allied forces in
Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The attack resulted in nineteen
fatalities and hundreds of wounded. The perpetrators escaped, and no group or
individual claimed responsibility for the bombing. 91
The method of using bombs in terrorist attacks became frequent long
before the Dhahran attack. Some scholars have commented that this form of
terrorism proved itself to be quite efficient in comparison to former methods. 92
All through the 1970's and the 1980's terrorist groups such as the Irish
Republican Army and ETA used car-bombs to generate destruction. According
to the Terrorism Research Center, since 1960 there have been over 4,000
bombing attacks throughout the world. These include small local bombs with
little to no injuries, as well as large bomb attacks such as the one against the
Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, or the Oklahoma City bombing
against an American federal building office complex in April 1995.93
Nonetheless, unlike prior terrorist bombing attacks, the Dhahran
bombing attack had an imperative impact on the international community's
response to such terrorist bombings. After the attack, the U.S. military and
intelligence community were heavily criticized for a lack of foresight that was
considered an intelligence failure that could have been avoided. 94 Even more
profound was the observation by U.S. officials that the attack was not an

"Massive bomb rocks U.S. military complex", report by CNN, Jun. 26, 1996,availableat
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9606/25/saudi.explosion.
92 Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97(3) AM. POL.
Sc. REv. 343-361
(2003).
93 See http://www.terrorism.com.
94 Douglas Jehl, Fatal Lapses - A Special Report: How U.S. Missteps and Delay Opened Door to
Saudi Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 1996.
91
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isolated case, but rather it was a part of an escalating global jihad ideology. 95
One month after the Dhahran bombing attack, on late July 1996, the
Group of Seven Major Industrialized countries (also known as the "G7") and
the Russian Federation, met in Paris. At that conference the ministries ofjustice
accepted an American proposal to develop a new international instrument on
terrorist bombings. 9 6 It is a common view that the Dhahran bombing was the
trigger for this initiative. 9 7 Shortly after, the UN established an Ad Hoc
working group of the Sixth Committee on the subject. The working group
based its work primarily on a draft of the convention submitted by France on
behalf of the G7. 98
The Working Group drafted a Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings (the Bombing Convention). The draft was criticized by
developing countries for lacking a clear definition of what "terrorist bombing"
is, and was perceived as a tool of the developed countries to gain jurisdiction
over political offenses outside their territories. 99 In spite of these protests, the
Convention was adopted by the UN on 15 December 1997 and entered into
force on 23 May 2001.
The Bombing Convention prohibits bombing of targets that are certain
to cause a large number of civilian casualties. 00 The Convention broadened
and strengthened international enforcement and cooperation in cases of
international terrorism. 101 By requiring member states to outlaw different types
of weapons detonations, such as chemical, biological and radiological, the
Convention filled a serious gap in the international law regime.102 The
Convention was based on the structure of prior counter-terrorism conventionsl 03
and was used as the core text for drafting the Financing Convention, which was

Toussef M. Ibrahim, Saudi Rebel are Main Suspects in June Bombing of a U.S. Base, N.Y.
TImES, Aug. 15, 1996.
96 Declaration of the G7 Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, Paris,
France, Jul. 30, 1996, 17.
9 Samuel M. Witten, CurrentDevelopments: The InternationalConvention for the Suppression of
TerroristBombings, 92(4) AM. J. INT'L. L. 774-781 (1998).
98 U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorist Bombing, Press Release L/2825 I' Meeting, U.N. Ad Hoc
Committee on TerroristBombing, Feb. 24, 1997.
9 General Assembly, Report by the Sixth Committee: Summery record of the 3 0'h meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/52/SR.30 (Dec. 4, 1977).
100 Bombing Convention, supra note 14, § 1. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter & William BurkeWhite, An InternationalConstitutionalMoment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 10 (2002).
101 Witten, supra note 97, at 781.
102 Seth Brugger, InternationalLaw, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Finding and
Filling the Gaps, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 803, 819 (2005).
103Christopher C. Joyer, InternationalExtradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing International
Criminalsto Justice, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 493, 527 (2003).
9
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adopted two years later. 104
The Applicability of the Bombing Convention to a Cyberterrorism
Attack105
Article 2 of the Bombing Convention defines the offenses under the
scope of the Convention. The Article contains three categories of offenses - an
offense committed by the main perpetrator, an attempt to perform the offense,
and various forms of accomplices. The following paragraphs will evaluate
whether the Bombing Convention could apply in case of Cyberterrorism.
Article 2(1) of the Bombing Convention reads as follows:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally
delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other
lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State
or government facility, a public transportation system or an
infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury; or
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of
such a place, facility or system, where such destruction
results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.
The offenses in Article 2(1) consist of several elements. Since
cyberterrorism differs from "physical" terrorism only in terms of the act being
performed, and not in the state of mind of the terrorist performing it, the two
alternatives regarding the intention of the offender will not be analyzed. A
cyberterrorist has the same intentions as a "normal" terrorist and thus there will
be no legal difference in attributing intention to either one of them. The
discussion below will examine the applicability of the acts described in the
Article in a cyberterrorism scenario.
The offense requires that the perpetrator performs one of four physical

Financing Convention, supranote 4; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supranote 15, 32.
105 The following interpretation of the Bombing Convention is based on numerous sources. First
and foremost, the definition clause set forth in Article 1 of the Convention. As will be elaborated
ahead, Article 1 sheds light on some key expressions in the offenses definition. In addition, the
interpretation also relied on reports and protocols of the Working Group which drafted the
Convention as well as other relevant literature.
104
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actions- delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal
device", against one of four locations - "place of public use, a State or
government facility, public transportation system or an infrastructure facility."
The application of Section 2(1) to a cyberterrorism attack depends first and
foremost on the meaning given to the phrase "explosive or other lethal device."
According to the definition set forth in Article 1(3), "an explosive or
other lethal device" stands for one of two possible interpretations. First, it could
mean "an explosive or incendiary weapon or device that is designed, or has the
capability, to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material
damage." A computerized infrastructure would probably fall short from
complying with this interpretation. A computer could be used to trigger a
bomb, but a computer in itself can not function as a bomb. The only way to
cause an explosion associated with computer based infrastructure is to attach an
external bomb to it, or to use the computers as the "red buttons" for triggering
the detonators.
The second possible interpretation for the aforementioned definition
was a later addition to the negotiation of the Working Group, which specifies
various forms of materials that their release could endanger the population. 106
According to Article 1(3)(b), "an explosive or other lethal device" could be "a
weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious
bodily injury or substantialmaterialdamage through the release, dissemination
or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or similar substances
or radiation or radioactivematerial." As opposed to the former interpretation,
this definition may very well fit the profile of cyberterrorism.
Computer infrastructures monitor and control the functioning of highly
dangerous and sensitive places, among which are nuclear reactors, biological
and medical labs and power plants. Computers are in charge of monitoring
levels of temperature, moisture, radiation and other data that is crucial to the
safety of these facilities. Hence, these computerized systems, these "devices",
could be subject to cyberterrorism and their disruption could lead to "causing
death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage through the release,
dissemination or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or
similar substances or radiation or radioactive material." Though designed for
the opposite purpose, such computer systems could be viewed as having the
capability of causing a large scale disaster.
Having established that "an explosive or other lethal device" could
mean computerized infrastructure, can a cyberterrorist "deliver, place, discharge
or detonate" it? On the basis of the guidelines in Article 31 of the Vienna
General Assembly, Report of the Working Group to the Sixth Committee on: Measures to
Eliminate InternationalTerrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/52/L.3, at 36-37 (10 October 1997).
106
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Convention for the Law of Treaties, the text should be interpreted in light of its
purpose. Therefore, it can be argued that disrupting the operation of a computer
system in a way that causes dangerous materials to be released is the equivalent
of detonating a bomb, or discharging it. Since the computer system is located at
the targeted site prior to the attack, the actions of "delivering" and "placing"
appear to be irrelevant. This interpretation is acceptable because the purpose of
the text is not compromised by addressing cyberterrorism, although it could be
countered by arguments supporting the literal approach to treaty interpretation.
The third and last parameter that is noteworthy is the locations
category. These represent places where terrorist attacks had typically occurred
and where the public would be put at the greatest risk of harm due to such
attacks. 107 According to Article 1 of the Convention, all four items refer to
physical locations such as public facilities or governmental buildings- 10 all
locations in which cyberterrorists can execute attacks through "discharging or
detonating" an "explosive or other lethal device."
In conclusion, the Bombing Convention allows a relatively flexible
interpretation of the offense set forth in Article 2. Each element of the offense
can embody a wide range of meanings, which gives the Convention a maximum
coverage. Due to this fact, an offender in the meaning of the Bombing
Convention could also be a cyberterrorist who interferes with computer-based
systems in a way that generates a release of dangerous substances in or against a
public place.

107
1os

Witten, supranote 97, at 776.
Bombing Convention, supra note 14, § 1:
"place of public use" means those parts of any building, land, street,
waterway or other location that are accessible or open to members of the
public, whether continuously, periodically or occasionally, and encompasses
any commercial, business, cultural, historical, educational, religious,
governmental, entertainment, recreational or similar place that is so accessible
or open to the public.
" state or governmental facility" includes any permanent or temporary facility
or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members
of Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of
a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or officials of
an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties.
"Public transportation system" means all facilities, conveyances and
instrumentalities, whether publicly or privately owned, transportation of
persons or cargo."
"Infrastructure Facility" means any publicly or privately owned facility
providing or distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as water,
sewage, energy, fuel or communications."
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IV. THE FUTURE REGULATION OF COUNTER CYBERTERRORISM
The previous section analyzed the applicability of the two international
counter-terrorism conventions to cyberterrorism.
The conclusion of this
examination was that the current counter-terror regime might apply to a
cyberterror attack, but it is not obvious that it will. There is a fair chance that a
legal tribunal will prefer a literal interpretation of the counter-terror conventions
and in doing so may exclude cyberterrorism from their scope.
This section offers five additional legal regimes for combating
cyberterrorism, outside the current conventional regime. These alternatives are
the Draft International Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism; the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime; a particular convention for the suppression
of cyberterrorism; international criminal law as codified in the statute of the
International Criminal Court; and Security Council resolutions. As will be
illustrated ahead, each one of the abovementioned instruments has its own
advantages and deficiencies.
A. Draft International Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism
In 1996, India transmitted to the Secretary General of the UN for
consideration by Member States a Draft International Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism (Draft Convention). 109 The Draft Convention
proposed by India was revised several times, until the latest draft was published
by the Ad-Hoc Committee in 2002.110 In many respects, the Draft Convention
is similar to prior conventions.'
The improvements the Draft Convention
introduces relate to the coverage of all acts of terrorism and to a greater extent
of prevention and cooperation obligation.
The literature highlights the role of the Draft Convention in
strengthening the international community's condemnation of terrorism. 112 It
places states which sponsor terrorism on a defensive side and assist in the
creation of an international customary denunciation of terrorism.113 In addition,
it would complement and guide the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee

Letter dated 01/11/96 from the permanent representative of India to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doe. A/C.6/51/6 (Nov. 1, 1996).
110 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 15.
n1 Trahan, supranote 36, at 231; Ash U. Bali, InternationalLaw and the Challenge of Terrorism, 9
J. ISLAMIC L. & CULT. 1, 19 (2004).
112 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Supra note
15, Annex I.A, 8.
113Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and InternationalLaw, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
297, 358 (2003).
109
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established by the Security Council. 1 14
The Draft Convention's potential contribution to the international
struggle against terrorism is hampered by two weaknesses, holding back any
progress towards its adoption."' First and foremost, the Draft Convention
includes only a limited definition of terrorism. 1 16 For the Draft Convention to
truly provide a comprehensive basis to combat international terrorism, it must
be applicable to all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by
whoever committed.1 17 The definitional problem is expressed in two core issues
-the execution of terrorist acts during armed conflicts," and state-sponsored
harboring of terrorists and colluding in terrorist crimes.119
Despite these weaknesses, the Draft Convention is still considered to
be a significant step towards unifying international cooperation against
terrorism.120 The applicability of the Draft Convention to Cyberterrorism is
examined with regard to the offense defined in the Draft Convention. However,
it should be noted that the preamble to the Draft Convention defines the scope
of the Convention so as to address the general category of "acts, methods and
practices of terrorism,"1 2 1 thus providing a relatively low threshold enabling
interpretation that includes cyberterrorism under the scope of the Draft
Convention.
According to the Draft Convention, each state party undertakes to
establish the offenses set forth in Article 2 as criminal offenses under its

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, Supra note 15, Annex I.A, 2.
Supplementing to the two main weaknesses, concerns were also raised regarding the
compatibility of the Draft Convention to the standards of human rights protection. This point
requires a complex and in depth debate on the relationship between terrorism and human rights, and
because it does not address directly the applicability of the definition in the Draft Convention to
cyberterrorism, it overflows the scope of the current examination. See Bruce Broomhall, State
Actors in an InternationalDefinition of Terrorismfrom a Human Rights Perspectibe, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 421, 421 (2004).
116 Lippman, supra note 113, at 357; Gerhard Hafner, Certain Issues of the work of the Sixth
Committee at the Fifty-Sixth GeneralAssembly, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 156 (2003).
117Malvina Halberstam, The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: from
Exempting NationalLiberationMovements to Criminalizing Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever
Committed, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 584 (2003).
118 Trahan, supra note 36, at 231; Broomhall, supra note 115, at 428.
119 John P. Grant, Beyond Montreal Convention, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT"L L. 453, 471 (2005);
Broomhall, supranote 115, at 428.
120 Lippman, supra note 113, at 357-358.
121 Draft Convention, Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee established by General
Assembly resolution
51/210 of December 1996, General Assembley Official Records, fifty-seven session, Supplement
no. 37 UN Doc. A/57/37, preamble.
114
115
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domestic law. 122 The Draft Convention also addresses issues of jurisdiction,
cooperation between states, prosecution and enforcement measures and more.
Article 2(1)(b) provides that:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and
intentionally causes serious damage to public or private
property, including a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system, an
infrastructure facility or the environment, when the purpose of
the conduct, by it nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an International
Organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
Article 1(3) defines "infrastructure facility" as:
Any publicly or privately own facility providing or
distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as
water, sewerage, energy, fuel, banking, communications,
telecommunications and information networks.
The reference in Article 2(1)(b) to "any means" combined with the
definition of "infrastructure facility" as including "communications,
telecommunications and information networks," enables the offense set forth in
the Draft Convention to apply to cyberterrorism attacks. Its language is wide
enough and clear enough to address cyberterrorism directly. The main
advantage of this is that there is no need to rely on interpretation methods which
could be argued against by those who represent a different school of legal
thought.
Using computer-based communications networks qualifies as "any
means," and harming computer-based infrastructure, or an "infrastructure
facility" is written in plain English. This leaves little room to argue that
cyberterrorism falls short of the Draft Convention's definition of the offense.
Nonetheless, while the Draft Comprehensive Convention offers a definition
which can encompass cyberterrorism directly, there are still major issues
withholding any progress towards its adoption.

122

Id., Article 4.
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B. Regulation through the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
In 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on
Cybercrime1 23 (Cybercrime Convention). The Cybercrime Convention is the
product of four years of work by experts from the Council of Europe, the United
States, Canada, Japan and other countries, and it is open for signature for all
countries. The Cybercrime Convention's main objective, as set out in the
preamble, is to pursue a common and harmonized criminal policy aimed at the
protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate
legislation and fostering international co-operation.
Although the term "cybercrime" implies crime occurring on the
Internet or via the internet, the scope of the Cybercrime Convention goes
beyond such crimes and also includes crimes that occur through the use of a
computer and crimes that involve computers in general. 124 For instance, the
Cybercrime Convention has been supplemented by an additional protocol
making any publication of racist and xenophobic propaganda via computer
networks a criminal offense. 125 Also in this respect, it is worth mentioning that
although the substantive law provisions relate to offenses using information
technology, the Cybercrime Convention uses technology-neutral language so
that the substantive criminal law offenses may be applied to both current and
future technologies involved. 12 6 This approach has many advantages, and it
may prevent the emergence of legal gaps in the future like the one we are facing
now concerning cyberterrorism.
The Cybercrime Convention requires states parties to criminalize
offenses included therein in their domestic laws. However, the convention was
criticized for not including any guidelines detailing the elements required for
those offenses, leaving the matter to the discretion of the states parties, thus
leading to the creation of a de facto fragmented legal framework instead of
fulfilling the purpose of the Cybercrime Convention which was to unify the
legal handling of the issue. 127 The Cybercrime Convention set forth provisions
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 8, 2001, E.T.S. 185. (hereinafter
"Convention on Cybercrime").
124 Sara L. Marler, The Convention on Cyber-Crime:Should the United States Ratify? 37 NEw
ENG.
L. REv. 183, 185 (2002).
125 Additional Protocol to the Convention on cybercrime, concerning the
criminalization of acts of a
racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, Jan. 23, 2003, E.T.S. 189.
126 Convention on Cybercrime, Explanatory Report.
available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm
127 For instance, Article 4(2) allows Parties to enter a reservation concerning
the offense set forth in
paragraph (1), in that they may require that the conduct result in serious harm. The interpretation of
what constitutes such serious harm is left to domestic legislation. See also Shannon L. Hopkins,
123
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regarding criminal sanctions, jurisdiction, mutual legal assistance and more.
Chapter II of the Convention deals with substantive as well as procedural legal
issues. Section 1 of Chapter II defines nine offenses divided into four different
categories.
All the offenses contained in the Cybercrime Convention must be
committed "intentionally" for criminal liability to apply. Thus, a preliminary
question should be raised as to whether the mens rea of the "cyber-criminal" is
different than that of the "cyber-terrorist." As noted in Chapter 1,128 a mere
"intention" to commit an attack does not render that attack a terrorist attack.
For a terrorist, as opposed to a criminal, it is required that the intention was to
use the attack in order to influence policy makers. Therefore it is unclear
whether the term "intentionally" in the sense of the Cybercrime Convention also
covers that type of intention.
However, if it is assumed that the special intention associated with
terrorists could be proved with regard to the term "intention" in the Cybercrime
Convention, then most of the various offenses included in the Convention could
apply to cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism attacks could be carried out through
illegal access to a computer system without right, 129 or through the interception
of non-public electronic data transfer.13 0 It is also conceivable that infliction of
damage to the integrity and proper functioning or the use of stored computer
data or computer programs will be part of a cyberterrorist attack.131 Similarly,
the rest of the offenses described in the Cybercrime Convention could also take
place during a cyberterrorist attack, namely, the hindering of the functioning of
a computer system,132 misuse of devices,133 computer-related forgery, and
fraud. 134 Specific offenses regarding child pornography 35 and intellectual
property rights 3 6 are less relevant to cyberterrorism activities.
To summarize, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
contains some offenses which could be carried out through cyberterrorism.
Nevertheless, the mens rea attributed to the perpetrator is merely "intention,"
and not the unique intention characterizing terrorism, aiming for consequences

Cybercrime Convention: A Positive Beginning to a Long Road Ahead, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101, 113
(2003).
128 id.
129 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 123,
E.T.S. 185 at § 2.
130 Id, at §
3.
131 Id, at
§ 4.
132 Id, at §
5.
133 Id, at § 6.
134 Id, at § 7, 8.
135 Id, at § 9.
136 Id, at
§ 10.
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at a policy level, beyond the immediate damage itself
Moreover, the
Cybercrime Convention provides only limited coverage. By June 2009 only
forty-six states singed the Convention, out of which only twenty-six ratified it.
This fact demonstrates how the political will of countries also plays a vital part
in determining the effectiveness of legal instruments. Even if the Cybercrime
Convention contained a mens rea relevant to terrorism, the adherence or lack
thereof by states would be the key factor in assessing its value.
C. Sectoral Convention for the Suppression of Cyberterrorism
Already in August 2000 experts from Stanford University published
"A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism"
(The Stanford Draft). 137 The Draft builds upon the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, which was in its final drafting stages. The Stanford
Draft proposes to criminalize several conducts, including, inter alia, using
cyber-systems to execute offenses specified in certain other treaties1 38 and
targeting critical infrastructures. 139
The Stanford Draft also suggests
establishing an international agency for information infrastructure protection, a
forum for developing standards and practices concerning cyber security. 140
As opposed to the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention
discussed above, the Stanford Draft specifically addresses the correspondence
between terrorism and computer communications based infrastructure. It does
not concern aspects of cyber acts which may constitute cyber-crimes but not
cyberterror. In contrast to the Draft Comprehensive Convention, the Stanford
Draft states clearly that it shall not apply to activities related to an ongoing
armed conflict. 141
Since the Stanford Draft was drafted no further steps were taken
towards presenting it before the UN Sixth Committee, and the project did not
develop into a more substantive legal work. Theoretically, the Stanford Draft
could become the basis to create an international convention for the suppression
of cyberterrorism. However, since it was drafted there have been two important
advancements which may render such a cyberterrorism convention obsolete.

Abraham D. Sofaer, Seymour E. Goodman et al., A Proposalfor an InternationalConvention on
Cyber Crime and Terrorism, Hoover Institution, Stanford University (2000).
138 Of the counter-terror conventions, Article 3 refers to the following: Tokyo Convention, supra
note 14; Hague Convention, supra note 14; Montreal Convention, supra note 14; Hostage
Convention, supranote 14; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supranote 14.
139 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 123, E.T.S. 185 at Art. 3.
140 Id. at Art.
12.
141 Id. at Art.
20.
137
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First, while the Stanford Draft remained an academic project, the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime came into force. The latter
created a framework that treats many issues that were also raised in the Stanford
Draft. This poses a critical question mark before the proponents of the Stanford
Draft, as to whether there is a further need to treat numerous issues parallel in
both instruments, or is the Cybercrime Convention enough.
Second, the drafting of the Comprehensive Convention is already
underway, and, as seen earlier, its definition of offenses could encompass
cyberterrorism. Thus, the resources that would be invested into concluding the
cyberterrorism convention could be devoted into concluding the comprehensive
convention, a generally more practical goal.
On the other hand, an independent counter-cyberterrorism convention
could be a perfect tailor-made instrument to deal with cyberterrorism. A
separate convention could furnish specific clauses that are designed to address
the special features of cyberterrorism. It can establish designated mechanisms
and mutual assistance procedures that are relevant to cyberterrorism, but may be
excluded from the Comprehensive Convention due to its more general nature.
Still, the core obstacle in the way of such a solution is the current lack of an
updated draft to present before the Sixth Committee, or any other forum for that
matter.
D. Terrorism as an International Crime
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute, establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC), entered into force. 142 Terrorism was excluded from the
Rome Statute, presumably due to the following grounds: the offense of
terrorism was not well defined; some acts of terrorism were not deemed to be
sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution by the ICC, 143 and there was

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (hereinafter
"Rome Statute"). For a thorough discussion on the International Criminal Court, see: Antonio
Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2008); William Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2004).
143 Article 1 of the Rome Statute set forth that:
"An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall
be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred
to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed
by the provisions of this Statute" (emphasis added).
In addition, Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute set forth that "The jurisdiction of the Court shall be
limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the internationalcommunity as a whole." See
142
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considerable concern that the inclusion of terrorist crimes in the Statute would
politicize the Court.144
Some scholars believe that the reason terrorism was not included in the
Rome Statute was the fact that it was already proscribed under existing
conventional arrangements. 14 In my opinion, this last argument is not as strong
as the former ones, since genocide was also addressed as early as 1948146 and it
was still reiterated in the Rome Statute. The inclusion of genocide in the statute
of the ICC allowed the ICC to have jurisdiction over it, rather than leave it to
application of universal jurisdiction by states. Similarly, entrusting the ICC
with jurisdiction over terrorism in general and cyberterrorism in particular,
would mean including it in the statute.
Whatever the reasons may be, the idea to address terrorism through the
Rome Statute was not entirely rejected. A Review Conference, anticipated to be
held in early 2010 in Uganda, 147 should consider the crime of terrorism "with a
view to arriving at an acceptable definition and its inclusion in the list of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court." 148 There are important benefits to be
derived from the inclusion of the crime of terrorism in the Rome Statute. 149It
could, for instance, assist states in bringing terrorists to justice, while
overcoming domestic weaknesses which prevent them from doing so in local
courts; and send a strong political signal about the seriousness with which the
international community views international terrorism. 5 0
The current mandate of the ICC is to hold jurisdiction with respect to
four types of international crimes: 51 genocide; crimes against humanity, war
crimes; and the crime of aggression. With regard to the latter, Article 5(2) of
the Rome Statute provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression once an agreed definition of that crime is adopted. Since no such
definition has yet been adopted, the following discussion will only address the
first three categories of international crimes.
Is it possible to include cyberterrorism under the aforementioned

Grant, supranote 119, at 465.
144 Christian Much, The InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism
as an International
crime, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 121, 126 (2006).
145 Grant, supra note 119,
at 465.
146 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
147 ICC, Resolution ICC-ASP/7/Res.2, Adopted at the 7th plenary
meeting, (Nov. 21,2008).
148 United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 15-17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), p. 72.
149 Much, supra note 143, at 134-136.
Id, at 135.
151Rome Statute, supranote 141,
150

§ 5.
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crimes? Where genocide is concerned, the answer will probably be that it does
not include terrorism, and therefore could not include cyberterrorism as well.
This category represents an international offense that has a long history and
clear parameters.152 As to war crimes, it is possible that a systematic and large
scale cyber attack against civilian objects could comply with the definition of
war crimes as set forth in the Rome Statute.153 Although a degree of overlap
does exist between humanitarian law and terrorism, the relation between them is
not entirely clear. The discussion above regarding the disagreement about
whether to include acts of terrorism committed during an armed conflict under
the scope of the Draft Convention demonstrates that controversy. As long as it
is not clear if acts of terrorism are treated differently in the context of armed
conflicts, there is still a long way to go before there is an acceptance in
considering terrorism as a war crime.
The idea that the definition of the term "crimes against humanity"
contained in the Rome Statute could include terrorism is not new, though not
widely accepted. 15 4 Article 7 of the Rome Statute sets forth a list of acts which,
if committed knowingly as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, are considered crimes against humanity.
Cyberterrorism is not suitable to be included in the first ten out of eleven acts
enumerated in the Article. Such acts include, inter alia, murder, enslavement,
deportation, torture and persecution. Those acts, as well as the rest of the acts
listed, cannot be carried out through cyberterrorism. Harming communications
infrastructure is not on the list. Even sub-article (k), which leaves room for
future developments in the words of "other inhumane act" sets a high threshold
for such inhumane acts to constitute crimes against humanity. It clearly states
that the inhumane acts should be "of a similar character." Since cyberterrorism
is by its nature different then the aforementioned acts, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to argue that it can be included under sub-Article (k).
To conclude, international criminal law is not helpful as long as there
is no clear definition of terrorism as an international crime in the Rome Statute.
As seen earlier, terrorism could not be addressed within the current international
crimes. It is currently in the hands of the Review Conference to determine
whether there will be a change in this respect, or whether terrorism will remain
excluded from the Rome Statute.

152
153
154

Grant, supranote 119, at 465.
Rome Statute, supranote 141, § 8, in particular section (2)(b)(ii).
Much, supranote 143, at 127-129.
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E. Security Council Resolution on the Suppression of Cyberterrorism
The power of the Security Council to adopt legally-binding decisions,
vested in it by Article 25 of the UN Charter,15 1 is considered a strong and
effective implementation tool which has a global application to all members of
the UN. 156 In countries where international law is absorbed directly into the
domestic legal system (i.e. a monastic system as opposed to a dualistic system),
Security Council Resolutions are given the status of binding domestic
legislation. A clear example of that is Resolution 1373, 11 which demonstrates
the authority of the Security Council to take various obligations from the
existing counter-terrorism conventions and apply them to all UN member states,
regardless of whether they signed those conventions or not. 158
When considering turning to the Security Council as an avenue to
combat cyberterrorism, the issue of legitimacy should also be taken into
account. On the one hand, it is an exclusive club of fifteen members that are not
accountable to other UN organs.159 Any one of the permanent five members
("P-5") has the ability to veto any resolution with which it does not agree
without needing to provide an explanation, which enhances the political
character of the Council. 160 On the other hand, it can react promptly to urgent
global threats, especially in cases where international law does not provide an
answer.161 It might even be said that in addressing terrorism the traditional law
making approach falls short from delivering a genuine counter terrorism regime
and that without the interference and pressure by the Security Council the
counter terrorism conventions would have been left as dead letters. 16 2
Another point that should be raised is the fact that the debate preceding
Security Council Resolutions is by and large shorter than the one accompanying

Article 25 sets forth that: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
156 Trahan, supra note 36, at 239. See also Payal K. Shah, Assisting and Empowering
Women
155

Facing Natural Disasters: Drawingfrom Security Council Resolution 1325, 15(3) COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 711, 716 (2006).
157Resolution 1373, supranote 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 189.
158Trahan, supranote 36, at 240.
159Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the
Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 275-308 (2008).
160Justin S. Gruenberg, An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution: Are All
Countries TreatedEqually?, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 469-511 (2009).
161Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "GlobalLegislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative? 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542, 544 (2005); Shah, supranote 156, at 717.
162 For further elaboration on the role of the Security Council in strengthening the counter terrorism
conventions see Rosand, supranote 160.
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the drafting and adoption of a treaty. 163 It could take years for states to draft a
convention for the suppression of cyberterrorism, and who knows how much
time will pass before the Draft Convention will be finalized. A Security
Council resolution by itself could be an effective tool in the short run, although
it does not have the substance to create a full international counter
cyberterrorism instrument. Thus, issues of cardinal importance like those
discussed with regard to the Draft Comprehensive Convention could be left
unaddressed for the sake of adopting the resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
The international community has a rare and unique opportunity to take
a preventive approach and create the legal framework that will make sure the
international community is prepared for the "day after" a cyberterror attack.
Many leaders of western countries, as well as numerous scholars have already
identified cyberterrorism as the next phase in the evolution of terrorism. It is
only logical that such a threat should be treated like other manifestations of
terrorism have been treated - through a clear and strict prohibition under
international law.
Characterized by some distinctive features, cyberterrorism presents
international law scholars with the challenge of whether the current counter
terrorism regime is sufficient or whether new instruments should be developed.
The language of the counter-terrorism conventions which were examined
developed along with time. From a relatively narrow terminology in the
Montreal Convention the law evolved to include phrases such as "any other
device" or "any means" in the Bombing Convention. The latter allows more
flexible interpretations of the legal conditions that are to be met in order to
establish legal responsibility for cyberterrorists. It is conceivable that these
differences stem from the rapid development of modem technologies in the last
three decades that led to the understanding among the legal community that
terrorism may manifest itself through these technologies. Thus, drafting of
conventions became more sensitive to the need to adjust to future developments.
The applicability of these two conventions to cyberterrorism is, as
demonstrated, possible. Nevertheless, as long as there is no clear prohibition on
any form of use of computer infrastructure for terrorist purposes the analysis
suggested above presents just one school of thought. There are other ways
interpretations could exclude cyberterrorism from the scope of the
abovementioned conventions. Given that my interpretation derives from the
text, but is not embedded in the text, it leaves room for opposite claims. For this
163

Trahan, supranote 36, at 242-243.
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reason it is important to explore the options to explicitly prohibit
cyberterrorism. As long as there is no clear cut prohibition on cyberterrorism in
all forms and methods, then we are not as prepared to deal with cyberterrorism
as we can be.
Creating a direct prohibition on cyberterror can take many forms, as
discussed at length in Part IV. There are at least five other possible courses of
actions that may be used to target cyberterrorism. Each of these options has
advantages, as well as deficiencies, preventing any of them from being an
"ultimate" counter cyberterrorism legal instrument. While some of the tools
may provide a relatively efficient way, their scope is rather limited. Other tools
enjoy a wider coverage but at the same time are not suitable for cyberterrorism.
A combination of the various instruments described may prove to be a
better way to address the issue. Such a regime will include a clear prohibition
of cyberterrorism via the Draft Comprehensive Convention or through a sectoral
convention drafted for this purpose, in addition to an acute Security Council
resolution under Chapter VII as well as criminalizing cyberterrorism in the
Rome Statute and/or amending the Council of Europe's Convention on
Cybercrime.
This course of action will allow for an expeditious filling of the current
gap in international law with respect to cyberterrorism. It would enable the
international community to have the direct legal basis to combat it, rather than
recourse to treaty interpretation. Moreover, relying on different instruments
would contribute to the legitimacy of the regime, as it will aspire to balance the
binding Security Council resolution with the ability of states to comply with
provisions of other conventions in accordance with the domestic legal system.
While it is left in the hands of computer experts to ensure that data
protection programs will combat cyberterrorism on the technological aspect, it
is in the hands of international legal experts to make sure that if they fail, and a
cyberterror attack is successful, we will have the means to bring the
cyberterrorists to justice.
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